Dear all, thank you for dialing into Frontline's quarterly earnings call. Frontline is reporting its best quarter ever. Our long-term strategy of growing voyage days and VLCC exposure during the slim years post-COVID has come to fruition, and our shareholders are now reaping the benefits. There are lots of moving parts in this market and no playbook. The key takeaway, though, is that the prevailing situation will have long-term implications. The current environment puts our lean organization to the test, and we are extremely thankful for the hard work the Frontline Global team is putting in, in keeping the propellers turning in this ocean of profits. Before I give the word to Inger, I'll run through our TCE numbers on slide three in the deck. In the second quarter of 2026, Frontline achieved $152,700 per day on our VLCC fleet, $111,400 per day on our SUSEMAX fleet, and $92,400 a day on the on our LR2-slash-Apramax fleet. So far in the second quarter of 2026, 86% of our VLCC days are booked at $156,900 per day. 79% of Arsus Max days are hooked at $117,400 per day, and the LR2s are catching up, having booked 70% of the days at $81,000 per day Again, all numbers in this table are on a low-to-discharge basis, with the implications of ballast days at the end of the quarter this has. I'll now let Inger take you through the financial highlights. Thanks, Lars, and good morning and good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Then let's turn to slide four and look at the profit statement. We report profit of 659.2 million or $2.96 per share and adjusted profit of 580.2 million or two dollars and 61 cents per share in the second quarter of 2026. As Lars mentioned this is the best quarterly profit and adjusted profit ever recorded by the company. The adjusted profit in the second quarter increased by 235.3 million compared with the previous quarter primarily due to an increase in our TCE earnings. Ship operating expenses decreased by 4.3 millions from previous quarter and that was mainly due to sales of eight real disease in the first quarter and two susmex tankers in the second quarter and an increase supplier rebates which is partially offset by an increase in general running costs. Administrative expenses decreased by 2.4 million from previous quarter. This excludes the synthetic optional evaluation gain of 5.3 million in the second quarter and the synthetic optional evaluation loss of 5 point 8 million in the first quarter. Adjusted interest expense decreased by 4.8 million from previous quarters due to lower debt and increase decrease in interest rates lastly depreciation decreased by 4.7 million from previous quarter due to sales of vessels let's then look at the balance sheet on slide five front line has a solid balance sheet and a very strong liquidity of 1.2 billion in cash and cash equivalents including and drawn amounts of revolver capacity of 901 million marketable securities and minimum cash requirements bank as per the june the 30th we have no meaningful death maturities until 2030. remaining new building commitments as per end june was 601.1 million and relates to the acquisition of the nine new buildings from affiliates of Yemen. The company has secured new building financing of up to 737 million assets out in the press release. Then let's turn to slide six. In the second and third quarter of 2026, we reduced our financing costs through a combination of margin reductions on existing facilities for the remaining tenors and a full refinancing of selected facilities, reducing the weighted average interest rate margin by approximately 152 basis points from 178 basis points at the end of the first quarter over 2026 to 126 basis points upon completion of the process in the third quarter of 2026. The reduction was driven by amendments but with 24 basis points refinancings with 21 basis points and new building financing and asset sales with seven basis points. We have no debt maturities until 2028 and no meaningful maturities under 2030 supported by increased tenor across the portfolio as shown in the maturity chart. Then we can look at slide seven, feed composition, cash break even rates and OPEX. Upon delivery of the remaining VLCC new buildings and sale of two VLCCs, our fleet consists of 40 VLCs, 19 Zeus Maxx tankers and 18 Afra Maxx slash LR2 tankers, has an average age of 6.6 years and consists of 100% Ecovessels, where 69% are scrubber fitted. We estimate that average cash break-even rates for the next 12 months of approximately $23,800 per day for the VLCCs, $25,700 per day, for the ZeusMaxx tankers, and $22,200 per day for LR2 tankers with a fleet average estimate of about $23.900 per day. This includes dry dock costs for seven VLCs, seven SUSEMAX tankers, and eight LR2 tankers. The fleet average estimate excluding dry dock cost is about $22,300 per day, or $1,600 per day less. We recorded OPEX including dry dock in the second quarter of $9,200 per day for VLCS, nine thousand dollars per day for susmax tankers and thirteen thousand three hundred dollars per day for lr2 tankers this includes dry dock of one will see and three lr two tankers and the q2 26 fleet average opex excluding dry dock was eight thousand seven hundred dollars per day then lastly let us look at slide eight and the cash generation Frontline has a substantial cash generation potential with about 27,800 earning days annually. And as you can see from this slide, the cash generation, potential basis, current fleet, TC rates and average spot market rates as of August 28 is $2.3 billion, or approximately $10.35 a share, providing a cash flow yield of 24% basis current share price. A 30% increase of these rates will increase the cash generation potential to $3.1 billion, dollars or thirty dollars and ninety one cents per share and a 30% decrease of these rates will decrease the cash generation potential to 1.5 billion dollars or six dollars and eighty eighty cents per share with this I leave the word to Lars again central stage we see increasing risk in and around the Gulf area both in the Gulf of Oman, in the Red Sea. We also see increased risk in the Black Sea, and the Houthis have become active again. Tanker rates remain high, and inefficiencies carry the weight of the shipping market. And we also see high risk premiums on certain trades, in particular inner AG, which is somewhat Not illiquid, but at least showing on the bottom left-hand chart, you can see how the now somewhat theoretical TD3C index is printing levels nearing $600,000 per day. We tend to look at the TD15, and it's being dwarfed in this connection, but if you look closely on the left-hand scale, it's actually showing very close to $200,000 per day. Oil balances are kept in check by aggressive inventory draws. We are extremely surprised that the oil price manages to keep in this band between, say, $178 and somewhat north of 90. U.S., China, and the rest of the OECD are the key sources of these inventory draws. The question is, of course, for how long can we draw? The tanker order book paused over the summer. Lead times from ordering to delivery is now moving into three and a half years. So we're talking about 2030 deliveries, and we see this has created a bit of a vacuum in the ordering market after a quite frantic activity in the first half of the year. The long-term implications as fleets continue to age will be around the inventory refill story, energy security policies, and in the case of some sort of relief or some sort of solution between the U.S. and Iran, sanctions relief could also play a part. We are in the midst of a storm, I would say, but the long-term implications are at least easier to read. If we move to slide 10 and try and analyze a little bit what's behind us, it's actually easier to analyze the market after the fact. We've had an 82% reduction in crude oil exports from inside the Strait of Hormuz. I know this is a big question mark as certain agencies report higher exports than what's recorded out of the Middle East. Others are lower in respect of kind of transits by ocean through the Straits of Hormuz. Frontline are amongst the school of thought that believe we're somewhere between four and a half to five and a million barrels per day. China crude imports have created a cushion to the oil price, we believe, and it's actually reduced by 35% in the same period. What's happened is that we've seen huge growth in inefficiencies in the market to the tune of 23% increase in idling days per VLCC. But I do note that this is not waiting time or time where owners like ourselves are fiddling around trying to figure out what to do. This is basically due to the trade itself where inefficiencies are creeping into every aspect of the voyage and under contract and being paid you're actually waiting. We've also seen a great increase in the trade between particularly Latin America to the east of Suez. This basically results in the effective fleet supply tightening despite a decline in volumes. The increased SDS transfers of Fujairah and around Singapore and Malaysia also add to this. If you can imagine, the cargo flow that formerly used to be from inner Middle East Gulf to, say, Japan, it is now like a three times trip. You go firstly from Inner-Angie to Fujairah in some sort of shuttling traffic. Then you, by way of SDS, put the oil into another ship that takes it to Malaysia, where you again do an SDS operation before Japanese-controlled ships take it in to Japan. So basically moving the same barrels in an increasingly inefficient manner. We do see though that there is large gaps in the tracking data and this also confuses us and most market analysts as a lot of vessels are sailing dark, leaving a big blind spot. The headline figures may no longer be representative of the market But what is representative of the market is the rates that we are actually collecting. If you move to the next slide, the flows from Atlantic Basin has grown both outright by way of volume, but more importantly, by the way of distances it's actually sailing. In a normal market, you will have almost equal volume going from, say, U.S. Gulf into Europe as into Asia. Now, a larger part of the volume being exported out of the Atlantic Basin is actually taking the long route. With the Houthi action, we're also seeing some very specific inefficiencies for the Gamboa export that formerly used to sail through the Red Sea, where it's now to a greater degree going northbound, basically by way of you fill up a VLC three quarters full, take it through the Suez Canal, and then load up the remaining barrels in Sidi Qaedid, which is the end of the Sue Med pipeline. The supply shortage from the Middle East is further compensated by individual withdrawals in virtually any or every corner of the world, with U.S. and China being the largest contributors. Asia ex-China has increased the sourcing, again adding or creating the same tonnage. Despite the volume shortfall, as previously mentioned, the inefficiency and the growing distances yields the high tank demand we're currently experiencing. The big question though, and this is the question as we near winter, is how long can and will we draw on inventories as we approach the colder season in the Northern Hemisphere? If you look at the top right chart, this is always the onshore crew inventories. We have drawn materially the total, including other inventories as well, is actually nearing a half a billion barrels. There is still a lot of barrels to draw, but there's certainly a limit to how far down the various nations are willing to go in this very insecure situation we're in. If we move to slide 12 and look at the order books, these order books continue to grow or continued, I would like to say, going into Q3. Currently looking at the headline number of VLCCs, the order book is around 33.5% of the existing fleet. I do, however, think that one should look at the efficient fleet. And as we note here, around 166 or 167 vessels are not a part of kind of the commercially traded fleet, meaning that the VLCC order book currently is in fact very close to 40%. If you do the same kind of analysis across the asset classes that Frontline is exposed to you'll get to that the current kind of order book to fleet ratio is in the mid 30s percent we're actually closing in on what we saw in 2009 and this is of 2008-2009 and this is of course a concern looking forward however if you look at the aging of the fleet which we actually didn't have to this extent back in the late 2010, the situation looks far more balanced. So if you move to slide 13, you can see that the total order book of the asset classes we're involved in currently stands around 707 ships. As they deliver over the next five years, we'll see 578 vessels moving towards the 20-year threshold, which means that we'll have a total population of 1,293 vessels coming to age, assuming no scrapping. This is of course dwarfing the current order book. If we have a look at the summary then from this presentation, the current market dwarfs the previous cycles. I'd like to draw your attention to the orange column on the right hand side. Looking at what we thought was the strongest market we've ever seen in 2004, we're now twice that almost. The index is lying a little bit because a certain part of it is, of course, being weighed by both TC1 and TD3, which are inner AG loadings. But still, including that, we're way beyond what we've seen in previous years. And as I mentioned earlier in the presentation, constricted global oil supply yields inefficiencies, and we see new trades and much longer trade lines. Growing concern is starting to come forward for the supply cushion provided by primarily US and China. We have the Russia-Ukraine situation adding fuel to the fire with increased risk in the Black Sea. We also see reduced Russian product exports going forward. Although this is in many cases sanctioned barrels, it still adds to the products pool and it particularly affects the diesel supply going forward The growth in the tanker order book is slowing as the lead times are extending. We also see that yard expansions are stretched. There's been a little bit of a period now since we've heard of new births being launched, particularly in China. Energy security and inventory situation is likely to dominate the narrative if the current situation persists into the winter. Again, frontline is center stage with our VLCC heavy efficient business model. We do see that the long-term period market is actually starting to price in these disruptions to last for much longer. With that, I would like to open for question and answers. Thank you. To ask a question, you will need to press star 1 and 1 on your telephone and wait for your name to be announced. To withdraw your question, please press star 1 and one again. We are going to take our first question. One moment. And this question comes from John Chappell from Evercore ISI. Please go ahead. Thank you. Good afternoon. Lars, last quarter you spoke to, I think it was 5% of the fleet that you were estimated was sitting outside of the straight, and that was part of the inefficiencies. Didn't mention that today. Obviously, you had a lot of other data, but do you have an update on that? And as it relates to that, is that just right outside of the Strait, or is there a much greater geographical area that we're talking to where a lot OF ships are idling and basically adding to the inefficiencies? Surprisingly, we're actually observing that that's the number of ships that are idling outside of Oman, you could say, or the Gulf of Omani, stretching basically all down the Indian coast, has actually increased. But this has increased with the growing kind of volume coming out of the Middle East by way of STS. So firstly, you have the pipeline coming into Fujairah and the kind of the Omani coast outside. But secondly, now you have kind of an increased or have had at least an increased traffic in vessels coming out for STS business. The timing of this is somewhat difficult to nail down. So it means that if you are a charterer and you booked a ship, you're not exactly going to know the dates that STS ship is going to be ready for you. So this is creating a lot of delays. So this is why we see actually the population sitting in that region in particular is actually growing, completely illogical, to be quite honest, in the current market situation. Okay. Second one, more strategic, obviously a generational market right now, as you laid out in the last slide. And I think Frontline's track record and business model has been clear for the last 30 years. but you're doing some things that you haven't really done before with the time charters and like the two of the three-year time chargers, special dividend. Could this be an opportunity to really change the capital structure? I know Inger's done a lot with taking the cost of debt down and pushing all the maturities out, but could you use some of this generational upside to take the leverage down, or is that just something that's not part of the DNA? no i would say it's not really a part of our dna as i think i've said many times you know we we we have kind of an informal strategy of trying to to to cover kind of one third of our revenues as well as covering um one third off our key costs uh you know being fuel or or interest rates interest rates. Currently, the market conditions have kind of prompted us to secure some of the revenues on VLCCs. And we're actually a little bit above 30% right now, as we wait for the last new buildings to deliver. But I don't think it's really changed kind of the way we look at the capital allocation. You know, kind of our proposition to investors continues to be that we pay everything out and then we leave to the investor to decide whether he wants to reinvest that will only kind of it's never really going to disturb our dividends but I think the special dividends which you pointed to which came from selling two ships you know why we decided to just pay it out was basically due to the fact that we didn't really see much of kind of upside in reinvesting it in the market in the current kind of price environment we're in. So I think kind of frontline will just continue as we've always done. We pay the money to our shareholders. The leverage that we have now is comfortable considering the current market and where we are on asset values and so forth. So I think one should keep that in mind going forward all right very helpful thank you Lars thank you thank you we are now going to take our next question and this one comes from Greg Lewis from BT IG please go ahead yeah I thank you and good afternoon everybody and thanks for taking my questions on I did want to just if you could follow up Lars more on thoughts around to John's question around, you know, the decision to do the longer term time charters. Really, I'm kind of curious. You know, these are obviously opportunistic. You know, historically, we've seen a lot of one year. You can, it seems like, you know, hey, the price is the price at the time, but one year, the time charters in the B market, you know, are available. You know, I am kind of curious how, you know, you alluded to it, how is the actual depth of the two, three, and potentially longer time chart or market in for VLCCs as we kind of sit here looking at the back half of the year? Is there really customer demand for these that we could actually see maybe not frontline, but a real increase of these terms deals going forward, or was this kind of more of like a one-off? No, that's a very good question. You know, at the time when kind of these two-time charters, the two-year and the three-year, were concluded, I would say the depth was somewhat limited. But as we kind of got over the summer, currently, it's quite deep. And this is what we alluded to in our presentation a little bit as well. It seems like kind of, you know, what is deemed intelligent money is now increasingly interested in getting kind of longer-term contracts on. So we're talking about oil majors and the big kind of operators. So, you know, we could easily today do, you know, three, four, three-year time charters now, kind of, if we were willing to accept the current levels, which is, well, it's still south of $80,000 per day, but closing in. And it could actually be north of $18,000 depending on the position you can deliver the ship in. So I would say this is, you You know, we don't have a crystal ball in this market, right? So this is why, of course, you tend to end up fixing a little bit too early in retrospect. But I must say that the liquidity wasn't really there either. So you basically just had to make a decision. But now I think the game has changed a littlebit. And we see, you know, I think a good indicator is looking at the FFA market. But right now, exclusive of the Middle East, so exclusive of TD3C, the TD22, which is US Gulf to Asia kind of marker, that paper is trading kind of close to $100,000 a day for 2028, when there's 115 VLCCs being delivered. So I think the market is starting to potentially price in some of the tailwinds that we've been discussing, that in the event, well, first of all, the expectation is this situation to prevail for a while, which is just going to add further draws to the inventory, which is further going to strengthen the tail winds coming out of this ordeal at some point. So I'm actually happy to say that right now that market is pretty deep. I'd like to add one comment, though, which I probably should have mentioned. We did the two time chargers, but we also sold two ships. This is actually our way of being able to capture the inner AG profits because the actor that was willing to pay that kind of money for an almost 10-year-old ship, he had a reason for that, basically because it would enable him to get full control of the logistical chain of transporting oil through the Strait of Hormuz, because owners are actually starting, even the more adventurous owners are starting to be a little bit reluctant to sail through the Straits of Hommuz, meaning that if you are an inner Middle East or inner AG exporter, you're much better off basically just paying $135 million for a 10-year-old ship and controlling the entire logistical channel itself. But for us, since we don't trade into the AG, at least not currently, that was a way for us to capture that premium. And hence why we also just paid the proceeds out to shareholders. Okay, super helpful. And then I did have a question on, you know, I just was looking for some clarity on slide 12 where you kind of laid out your view of the VLCC fleet, the 900 ships. You know, just as we think about those, and I think you mentioned that there's maybe 170 ships that aren't really part of the active fleet, you know, maybe they're doing infrastructure or other types of issues. Is that the sanctioned fleet or is that other vessels because the sanction fleet, I would think, is trading? How do we think about, you know, where the – and then I'm also curious as we think about that sanctioned fleets, you now, is a good way to think about it of those 170-ish sanctionships. Those are all 15-plus-year-old vessels, or is it kind of more broad across the, I guess, the fleet age profile? No, I think, no, it's more, you know, it is more so that every vessel over 20 years is almost, almost all of them are sanctioned. Because in the commercial kind of, you know, markets where we operate, very few actors accept vessels that are north of or older than 20 years. There are some trading, but they're trading them kind of internally for big oil measures or refiners where they kind of control the technical management and the vetting of the ship themselves. So I would almost put like an equal sign between 20 plus and sanction. But speaking of the sanction fleet, you know, we're not really seeing kind of utilization increase on that fleet. But what we are seeing is that although extremely slowly, more and more are getting kind of sold for recycling. recycling. So it's a very, very kind of slow trend because you do face kind of the sanctions as you, you know, for the recyclers face it when they need to or want to purchase the steel. But there are kind of starting to we're starting to see movements there where some of these ships are getting removed. Okay, super helpful. Thank you very much and have a great weekend. Thank you. Same to you. Thank you. As a reminder, to ask a question, you will need to press star 1 and 1 on your telephone. We are now going to take our next question. And this one is from Devin Tsongoi from Teji Investments. Please go ahead. College of Education lasts on a good set of numbers. I have a few questions. One, on when do you see the China, you know, as the winters will approach, China will come back in the market. And in that situation, how do you See the market? And second one is on the Suez. You have a drought and obviously the limited amount of ships are going to go through Suez now. How does it impact the flows of the smaller ships? First of all, on China, I think the question you're raising there is basically the biggest question of them all in shipping, because China has effectively reduced their imports. At certain periods, they basically halved it, and from what we understand from industry sources is that Chinese domestic demand is not materially reduced. And since imports are down to the tune of three and a half to five million barrels per day, for sure they need to be drawing on inventories. They have a huge pile of oil. They've actually been building inventories in the last years leading up to this situation in 2026. So they have a cushion, but at a certain point uh you know one you know somebody in beijing will start to think that maybe we should uh kind of uh be a bit careful on continuing here um i don't know whether if we're there yet i don'T know if we'll be there in a year's time uh it's very difficult to say um but but uh you know it's it's this is one of the kind of the big important questions but i think it's more important in respect of oil price rather than shipping at this point. Of course, it could propel shipping even further if they start to aggressively chase barrels, but I think this is more an oil price kind of thing than a shipping thing. When it comes to Suez, I think respectfully, you might be confusing Suez for the Panama Canal. The Panama Canal is where the drought is being experienced and and that's where kind of we're seeing reduced volumes but not really weak because the panama canal you know it's prioritized for containers and uh you know uh natural gas and lpg vessels um and you know kind of the rates and the way that uh kind of transits are organized uh very few tankers are are using kind of a canal as it is for the suez this has not yet been an issue that's been addressed and one more question on this scrapping what are your views uh we have seen no scrapping because the market's been very good but what's your view going forward on next state 12 to 24 months no as i as i mentioned a little bit previously you know we are seeing some some small positive developments on recycling or scrapping, as you say. The challenge has been that the recycling industry is a dollar-nominated industry too, so it means that they have difficulty in actually paying cash for a vessel that is sanctioned. What we have seen is that the US authorities have been willing to give exemptions for vessels that are not owned by owners that have sanctioned themselves. So it means that certain kind of quite well-renowned recyclers have been able to go to US authorities. is the vessel, this is the history of the vessel. These are the owners. Can we buy this and get an exemption or a license to buy this vessel for recycling? And they've gotten yes. But the number of vessels there, we're talking kind of in the teens, so it's not material looking at the vast fleet of sanctioned vessels currently. But at least it's a start. so how that will evolve going forward you know it's very difficult to say but it's a positive movement at least Thank you Lars Have a great weekend Thank you, you too Thank you We are now going to take our next question and this one comes from Audrey Song from China Securities Please go ahead Hi, good afternoon, Lars and Inger. This is Audrey Zong from China Securities. Lars, thank you again for joining our webinar with Chinese institutional investors in March. My first Next question is on the recent VLCC sale. We know that you sold two VLCCs for about $270 million. I think this is your decision to sell the VLTC because given the current strong rate environment. How did you compare the sale price with the present value of the future cash flows from continuing to operate the two tankers? Thank you. This is my first question. Yeah. Hi, Audrey. No, it's again an excellent question. There were two kind of key analysis that we applied to the considerations. One was kind of, you know, what is the implied value of the assets that Frontline own? And as we were priced by the market at the, you know, multiple of almost, well, at the time it was north of 1.3 times NAV, you know, the implied of the vessel was actually higher than what we achieved. But the second one is and this is where it gets a little bit kind of not mathematical to put it that way it's it's you know it goes a little on experience in this market you know we are operating in one of the most volatile markets in the world if not the most that volatility tells you that nobody actually knows what's going to happen around the next turn we looked at the assets and you know for us to decline selling at that level, we had to believe that we were going to make almost $70,000 per day every day until that vessel was 20 years old, or those vessels were 20 years old. If you look at kind of how our market has been moving historically, we thought that that was a bold ask. So, you know, of course, it was the highest price achieved for that generation of ships at the time. And that was basically the analysis. So basically what we do is we look at, you Know, what do we need to get the 15 return on equity, which is, you Now, where Frontline wants it to be kind of in order to make an investment case. and that resulted in this kind of rate requirement. And how likely was it that that rate requirement was going to be real? And we thought potentially not, maybe for the next couple of years, but not for nine and a half years or, sorry, 11 and a halve years or 11 years, whatever it was at the time. So that was basically the analysis. But you have a very good point. It was not an easy decision to make when you're standing in the middle of a market, which at the time was earning for the VLCC around $100,000 per day. It's, of course, something that needs deep consideration. Great. Great. Thank you a lot. That's very clear and very helpful. And my second question is on cash break-even rates. I noticed that despite the reduction in financing margins, I think you did a very great job in decreasing your financing cost. But actually, the Swiss max cash break even point increased to 25. feeding the VLCC break-even for the first time since 2021, based on our quarterly tracking. So does the $25,700 already reflect the benefit of the lower financing margins? If so, what other factors drove the increase, and how should we expect the SOSMAX cash break- even to trend in the second half of 2026. Thank you. Sorry, I wasn't hearing everything you asked about, but I think you were referring to the Swiss Max break-even rate. Is that correct? Yes. Inger, please allow me to repeat my question. Actually, it's why the Swiss Max cash break-in is even higher than even the LCC cash break even rate in Q2? The reason for that is that the dry dock components in the cash break-even rate for Q2 cash break even rates are much higher than it was for the Q1 cash break even rates. And then in addition to that in Q1 we had the undrawn depth or an RCF which was undrawn on one of the vessels which is assumed to be drawn in the Q2 break even rate. Okay, great. So can we expect that the Swiss max cash break even in Q3 and Q4 also have the trend like in Q2? Because I think it's increasing, the Swiss-max cash break-even. I'm not so sure I understood what you said now. What was the question again? Yeah, actually, it's three and Q4. What the Swiss Marks cash break even would be like? Since I think the Swiss Max cash break even is increasing. Sorry, these cash break-even rates are for 12 months forward. It is for 12 years. 12 months from the end of June 2026, you add on four quarters to the end of June 1027. So these cashback in rate of 27 NSR 25,700 for SUSEMAX vessels are for the 12-month period going forward, including then the Q3, Q4, Q1, and Q2 of 2027. It's an average. So, yeah. And it is explained by what I just said, that you have dry dock of seven vessels in that period which she did not have in the previous cashback even rate which we showed you for the end of the first quarter okay okay great I understand that thank you Inger thank you thank you that was the last question for today I I will now hand the call back to Lars for closing remarks. Thank you very much. And all of you, thank you for listening in. It's truly an exceptional market we are experiencing and also well into Q3. So looking forward to our call next quarter. Thank you so much.